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Introduction  
 
As a result of the rise in international terrorism and traumatic attacks such as the 2004 Madrid 
and the 2005 London bombings, the subject of Islamic radicalism is at the centre of 
international and national political debate. Responding to the threat of terrorism and 
radicalisation, the UK government introduced the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
(Home Office, 2015a). The question of how to address radicalisation is more relevant than 
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Abstract 
In response to the threat of terrorism and radicalisation, the UK government 
introduced the counterterrorism strategy CONTEST and its four strands ‘Prepare, 
Prevent, Protect, Pursue’. As one of these four strands, the ‘Prevent’ strategy dates 
back to 2003 and is tailored to avert radicalisation in its earliest stages. What 
stands out as particularly controversial is the statutory duty introduced in 2015 
that requires ‘specified authorities’ to “have due regard to the need to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism” (Home Office, 2015a, s. 26).  
Based on a critical analysis of the so-called Prevent Duty in educational 
institutions (excluding higher education), I argue that it not only has the potential 
to undermine ‘inclusive’ safe spaces in schools but may also hold the danger of 
further alienating the British Muslim population. Certain terminology such as 
‘safeguarding’ students who are ‘vulnerable’ to extremist ideas is misleading and 
conveniently inflated in order to legitimise the Prevent Duty and facilitate its 
smooth implementation. Largely based on Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, 
this in-depth analysis is best utilised in combination with empirical research on the 
impact of Prevent as conducted by Busher et al. (2017).   
However, the disproportionate targeting of British Muslims intertwined with the 
dual role of students as both at risk and, simultaneously, a risk, reveals that the 
Prevent Duty in educational institutions is deeply flawed in its implementation and 
has significant potential to alienate and radicalise the British Muslim population. 
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ever in the aftermath of contemporary attacks such as Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, and the 
more recent attacks on Westminster, London (March 2017), Manchester (May 2017), the 
London Bridge and the Borough Market (June 2017) as well as on the Finsbury Park mosque 
(June 2017). The London terror attack in 2005, now known as 7/7, first highlighted the need 
to develop specifically tailored counter-terrorism strategies: contrary to 9/11, terrorist attacks 
in the UK were not perpetrated by individuals entering the UK from the outside but by those 
who had grown up in the UK – a phenomenon responsible for coining the term ‘homegrown 
terrorism’ (Abbas, 2007; Cole, 2009; Thomas, 2009). This unanticipated trend has triggered 
an urgent and on-going debate on how to sufficiently tackle – and potentially prevent – the 
radicalisation of young people and specifically young British Muslims at an early stage.  
As one of the four strands of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, 
the ‘Prevent’ strategy dates back to 2003 and is specifically tailored “to stop people becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism” (Home Office, 2011a: 9). Since 2003, it has been revised 
multiple times and is also intended to “work with a wide range of sectors (including 
education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of 
radicalisation which we need to address” (Home Office, 2011a: 10). Of particular interest is 
the recently introduced ‘Prevent Duty’. With section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015, the government of England and Wales places a ‘statutory duty’ on 
‘specified authorities’ to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn 
into terrorism” (Home Office, 2015). These specified authorities include the schools of 
England and Wales. Being viewed as vulnerable teenagers with “young minds already 
susceptible to feelings of frustration, anger [and] hate” (Abbas, 2007: 4), Muslim youths find 
themselves at the very core of the national and local debate about ‘Islamist extremism’.  
A particular focus on Muslims in combination with the Prevent Duty imposed on 
educational institutions brings with it a variety of intertwined issues which should be subject 
to in-depth investigation. These theoretical issues with practical implications can be narrowed 
down to two main concerns: first, the official presentation of Prevent as a strategy providing a 
‘safe space’ (Ramsay, 2017) call into question whether the statutory duty – in practice – 
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creates or rather undermines safe spaces for students and subsequently facilitates a chilling 
effect on human rights such as the freedom of expression. 
 
A Brief History of the Prevent Strategy 
 
As one of four strands (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare) of the UK government’s 
counterterrorism strategy Contest, Prevent was originally introduced in 2003 and defines an 
ongoing struggle and “effort to find a legitimate democratic response to terrorism” (Cole, 
2009: 138). Essentially, the Prevent strategy aims at preventing the radicalisation of 
individuals – based on the assumption that “terrorists were individuals who has been through 
a process of radicalization” (Edwards, 2016: 298). Due to allegations of failure to confront the 
extremist ideology at the heart of the threat” and misplaced funding (Home Office, 2011b), 
the Prevent strategy was revised in 2011 under the Coalition Government to achieve a clearer 
separation of “community based integration work from the more direct counter-terrorism 
activities” (Dawson and Pepin, 2017: 3). Three primary objectives are formulated in the 
Prevent strategy:  
 
• respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those 
who promote it; 
• prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; and 
• work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address (Home Office, 2011b: 7).                                                                               
 
It is evident that the challenge of tackling terrorism is perceived as primarily related to 
ideology. Furthermore, in the 2011 revised Prevent strategy, the second objective (preventing 
people from being drawn into terrorism) is inextricably tied to the notion of vulnerability. 
Identifying radicalisation as an ongoing process, Prevent aims to intercept this process, to 
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support vulnerable people and to thereby prevent them from being drawn into “terrorism-
related activity (Home Office, 2011b: 8). The delivery and implementation of Prevent is 
coordinated by the Office for Security and Counterterrorism branch (OSCT) in the Home 
Office. Characterised by a predominantly local approach, the enforcement of Prevent relies on 
local governments and community engagement. These local authorities include “youth 
offending services; social workers; housing and voluntary groups” as well as educational 
institutions and health services (Home Office, 2011: 56). According to the Home Office’s 
‘New Burdens Assessment’ in 2015, 407 local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales are 
required to implement the Prevent Duty (Home Office, 2015d: 3). The de-radicalisation 
programme Channel is an essential part of the Prevent strategy:  
 
Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people 
who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme 
uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by:  
a. identifying individuals at risk;  
b. assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and  
c. developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned (Home 
Office, 2015c: 5) 
 
First piloted in 2007, Channel had been introduced as a voluntary programme, but was 
subsequently put on a statutory basis under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
(Home Office, 2015a). As a multi-agency approach with a particular focus on ‘safeguarding’ 
vulnerable individuals, it requires cooperation between local Channel panels, local authorities 
(e.g. social and health services, educational institutions, etc.) and the police. While the 
programme, just like the overall Prevent strategy, aims at targeting all types of radicalisation, 
the government advises that “Channel programmes should be prioritised around areas of 
higher risk, defined as those where terrorist groups and their sympathisers have been most 
active” (Home Office, 2011b: 60). In practice, then, Channel initiatives are most likely to 
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focus on the threat that has been identified as the most severe by the government, namely 
Muslim fundamentalism. The following diagram summarizes the different Channel stages as 
proposed by the Home Office: 
 
Figure 1: The stages of Channel referrals 
  
(Figure 1: The different Stages of Channel. Source: Home Office, 2015c: 6) 
 
Arguably, the identification of vulnerability to radicalisation represents the crux of the 
matter, which will be discussed more in-depth below. With an overall goal of having no 
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“‘ungoverned spaces’ in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenge and, 
where appropriate, by legal intervention” (Home Office, 2011b: 9), the successful 
implementation of Prevent is greatly dependent on the support and engagement of local 
authorities. 
 
The Prevent Duty 
 
In July 2015, as an extension of the overall Prevent strategy, the UK government introduced 
the Prevent Duty in order to tackle radicalisation within ‘specified authorities’ (e.g. 
educational institutions). Due to an emphasis on preventing radicalisation in young 
individuals, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 placed a statutory duty on specified 
authorities “to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism” 
(OSCB, 2016). It is this ‘due regard’ – the Prevent Duty – that has been subject to fierce 
controversy. One of those specified authorities are schools, where teachers now have the 
statutory duty to detect radicalisation in the form of ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ extremism. If 
teachers suspect pupils to be vulnerable to radicalisation, they are required to report them and 
to cooperate with the police as well as the Channel boards (Open Justice Initiative, 2016: 3). 
Targeting both ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ extremism, the Prevent Duty serves the purpose of 
intercepting the rise of radical ideology in its early stages.  
Even though the Prevent Duty claims to have the primary goal of safeguarding 
vulnerable individuals, it has been subject to substantial criticism. According to the Open 
Justice Initiative’s executive summary ‘Eroding Truest: The UK’s PREVENT Counter-
Extremism Strategy in Health and Education’, the Prevent Duty suffers from structural flaws 
including “the targeting of “pre-criminality”, “non-violent extremism”, and opposition to 
“British values”” (Open Justice Initiative, 2016: 4). Among the plethora of criticisms, three 
alleged shortcomings are most frequently mentioned: the potentially chilling effect on human 
rights caused by structural flaws such as the broad definition of ‘non-violent extremism’; the 
discriminatory potential against Islam and, in particular, against Muslim youths; and the 
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paradoxical relationship of the two co-existing statutory duties of ‘safeguarding’ (i.e. 
protecting) children ‘at risk’ and reporting ‘risky’ children. 
 
Ambiguous Terminology: ‘Radicalisation’ and ‘Extremism’ 
 
Given that ideology is delineated as the key factor in the process of radicalisation (Home 
Office, 2011b: 44), the Prevent Duty guidance provided defines radicalisation as referring “to 
the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated 
with terrorist groups” (Home Office, 2015b: 21). The logic of this description of radicalisation 
as a process is unsurprising; by definition, a process allows for governmental intervention 
(Heath-Kelly, 2013: 394) or disruption (Innes, Roberts and Lowe, 2017: 266).  
The terminology of radicalisation has been subject to considerable scholarly debate, 
which oscillates between classifying it either as a propaganda myth (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2009: 107) or as an ambiguous, but dominating concept: 
 
Rather than denying its validity, […] scholars and policy makers […] [should] work 
harder to understand and embrace a concept which – though ambiguous – is likely to 
dominate public discourse, research and policy agendas for years to come (Neumann, 
2013: 874).  
 
Arguably, radicalisation is a relational concept. The term ‘radical’ does not necessarily 
convey any meaning in isolation. In fact, its connotation depends to a great extent on what the 
majority of society defines as ‘mainstream’ or ‘normal’ (Neumann, 2013). Detecting 
radicalisation in individuals, then, is contextually dependant on what the majority of people 
perceive as ‘normal’. Naturally, such perceptions are rather subjective and can vary from one 
individual to another – thereby holding the potential to destabilise the concept of 
radicalisation. This is precisely why scholars such as Richards (2011) question the overall 
utility of the radicalisation terminology, claiming that “there is little discernible value in using 
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the idea of ‘radicalization’ to enhance our knowledge of why people become terrorists” as 
well as that “it has served to blur the counterterrorist response” (Richards, 2011: 145). 
Richard’s claim addresses a central paradox of the Prevent Duty: while schools are instructed 
to tackle radicalisation, the list of radicalisation indicators provided by the Home Office is 
blurry at its best, and highly misleading at its worst.  
What the definitional confusion regarding radicalisation may be concerned with is not 
so much the term itself, but rather its relational content; first, the distinction between 
cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, and second, the element of ‘non-violent’ extremism. 
While the Home Office argues that the official definition of radicalisation includes both the 
cognitive as well as the behavioural dimension (Home Office, 2011: 56), this approach has 
been criticised by certain academics, e.g. Horgan (2012; 2013) and Borum (2011). In short, 
both scholars contend that a focus on the cognitive dimension of radicalisation risks misplaces 
counter-terrorism responses due to the fact that not every person classified as ideologically 
radical will turn into a violent extremist and/or terrorist. The criticism of tackling cognitive 
radicalisation stems from repeated unsuccessful psychological attempts to profile terrorists 
(Horgan, 2008: 80). After the 7/7 bombings, a House of Commons Report stated that “[w]hat 
we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help 
identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation” (House of Commons, 2006: 31). Instead of 
seeking for root causes of radicalisation, Horgan (2008) contends that a focus on behavioural 
pathways and routes to terrorism may prove more valuable for targeting radicalisation.  
Arguably, despite claiming to target both cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, the 
government’s counterterrorism strategy may suffer from a predominantly ideological 
approach and thus be ill-equipped to thoroughly address the overall process of radicalisation. 
It is time to reject the myth that radicalisation solely occurs “by developing or adopting 
extremist beliefs that justify violence” and come to terms with the reality that this is just one 
of many pathways into terrorism (Borum, 2011: 8). Most academic radicalisation models (e.g. 
Moghadam’s ‘staircase model’, or Baran’s ‘conveyor belt’ model) take into account multiple 
push and pull factors of radicalisation, thereby recognising the conceptual validity of 
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radicalisation as a process (Elshimi, 2017). Similar claims were made by Borum (2011) after 
conducting a systematic literature review: according to his findings, factors such as perceived 
injustice, struggles of identity, as well as the desire for belonging were crucial predictors of 
radicalisation and extremist engagement. Consequently, it can be agreed that adopting a more 
holistic approach to radicalisation as advocated by Neumann (2013) or Elshimi (2017) is best 
equipped to detect and prevent radicalisation and extremism. In practice, this would entail to 
‘have due regard’ to signs of both cognitive and behavioural radicalisation in relatively equal 
parts. Nonetheless, the reality of detecting radicalisation, especially in youths, remains a 
complicated endeavour. According to the Oxfordshire City Council, changes in behaviour or 
attitude can include the following:  
 
withdrawal from usual activities; expressing feelings of anger, grievance or injustice; 
truanting / going missing from school or care; expressing ‘them and us’ thinking; 
using inappropriate language and / or advocating violent actions and means’ 
possessing extremist literature and / or expressing extremist views; associating with 
known extremists; seeking to recruit others to an extremist ideology (Oxfordshire City 
Council, 2017).  
 
Having ‘due regard’ to the above radicalisation indicators can potentially result in reporting 
teenagers for puberty-typical behaviour such as ‘expressing feelings of anger’ or ‘using 
inappropriate language’. As mentioned within the prior chapter, the Prevent Duty guidance 
provides an extremely broad definition of ‘due regard’: 
 
the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent 
people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to 
how they carry out their usual functions (Home Office, 2015b: 36).  
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Notably, it remains unclear what precisely is regarded as ‘an appropriate amount’ – thereby 
leaving the implementation of the Prevent Duty up to the discretion of staff members. In 
addition to these already vague instructions, ‘non-violent extremism’ is delineated as 
“extremism […] which is not accompanied by violence” (Home Office, 2015b: 36). 
‘Extremism’, then, the Home Office views as synonymous to  
 
vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the 
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members 
of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas (Home Office, 2015b: 36).  
 
It comes as no surprise that such vague definitions have caused great academic controversy. 
The notion of ‘non-violent’ extremism reinforces the government’s ideological focus by 
targeting an opposition to ‘British values’, which can potentially be challenged and opposed 
in many different ways. According to Ramsay (2017: 14), this definition is “literally 
expansive in the sense that it is non-exhaustive” due to the fact that it identifies only some 
values which are part of “a list of what British values ‘include’, [thereby] suggesting that 
there may be other unspecified ‘fundamental British values’”. This does not only enable a 
great extent of, first, uncertainty and, second, discretion for educational staff who are required 
to have ‘due regard’, but, in practice, depends on “the views and prejudices of the staff 
member involved in the surveillance of students’ conduct and speech” (Ramsay, 2017: 14) 
Essentially, the definition of radicalisation remains a grey area, and has been under attack for 
having a chilling effect on human rights such as the freedom of expression:  
 
[t]here are many people who oppose democracy; there are people who have 
alternative views on that: does that mean that they are never allowed to express those 
views[…], as part of an open discussion on these issues? (Baroness Warsi, Lords 
Hansard, 2015: Column 222).  
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With the government claiming that it is not always “desirable to draw clear lines” between 
terrorism and extremism (Home Office, 2011: 25), a rather questionable linear relationship 
between ideological extremism and terrorism is invoked, which could contribute to further 
problematising the identities of British Muslims (Spalek, 2011).   
 
The Implementation of Prevent in Educational Institutions 
 
‘Safeguarding’ and safe spaces 
In line with the programme’s second and third objective – to “prevent people from 
being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and 
work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to 
address” (Home Office, 2011b: 7) – the Prevent Duty relies on the terminology of 
‘safeguarding’ children by providing safe spaces.  
Arguably, the phrase safe space has become an “overused but undertheorized 
metaphor” (Barrett, 2010: 1). The Oxford Dictionary defines a safe space as “[a] place or 
environment in which a person or category of people can feel confident that they will not be 
exposed to discrimination, criticism, harassment, or any other emotional or physical harm” 
(Oxford Dictionary, n.d.). This original definition can be understood as the first layer to the 
definition of safe spaces; a space where no one is harmed or discriminated against. The 
second layer of safe spaces crystallizes in form of the statutory duty requiring educational 
institutions to  
 
[protect] children from maltreatment; [prevent] impairment of children's health or 
development; [ensure] that children are growing up in circumstances consistent with 
the provision of safe and effective care; and [take] action to enable children in need to 
have optimum life chances (OSCB, n.d.: 1).  
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This second dimension of safe spaces represents the obligation of schools in England and 
Wales to safeguard the child’s welfare (Children Act 2004, Chapter 31, Section 11(2a) and 
28(2a)).  
In short, the Prevent Duty adds another layer to the above established typology of safe 
spaces. The particular language use of ‘safeguarding’ and safe spaces – terms already familiar 
to educational institutions – has been criticised as a governmental means to legitimise the 
Prevent Duty, circumvent resistance and, thus, allowing for a relatively smooth 
implementation in educational institutions (Ramsay, 2017). At the issue’s core lies the 
question whether the Prevent Duty, by enforcing the element of surveillance in the classroom, 
undermines the trust between teachers and students (Marsden, 2015).  
Similar to radicalisation, safe spaces are a relational concept, with their underlying 
definition largely depending on the key question of what makes safe spaces necessary to 
begin with. It is the nature of the harm or threat that defines safe spaces. The required 
measures of coercion – such as potential referrals to Channel – could end up having a reverse 
effect (e.g. students do not voice their grievances). While the potential threat to ‘inclusive’ 
safe spaces in classrooms materialises in form of discrimination or harassment, the threat 
targeted by the Prevent duty is identified as extremist views and possible radicalisation. 
Arguably, both educational safeguarding duties (‘inclusive safe spaces’ and the Prevent Duty) 
share the same rationale, namely a “commitment to protecting vulnerable people from the 
potential ill-effects of others’ dangerous or offensive opinions” (Ramsay, 2017: 4).  Further 
analysis of these issues is provided in chapter 3.4 against the backdrop of individuals caught 
in the terminological triangle of ‘vulnerable – at risk – riskiness’.  
 
Referrals to the Channel Programme  
As part of the overarching Prevent strategy, the de-radicalisation programme Channel 
is a tool to tackle extremism before it can grow into extremist or violent behaviour. According 
to the Home Office, Channel is meant to be  
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a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support to individuals who are at risk 
of being drawn into terrorism. […] Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children 
and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their 
vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and 
before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity” (Home Office, 
2012: 4).  
 
In order to evaluate how this affects the statutory Prevent Duty in educational institutions, two 
key elements have to be considered: firstly, the use of the term ‘vulnerable’, and secondly, to 
what extent Channel referrals are utilised for children in educational institutions.  
First, the carefully employed terminology conceals that children are not only 
considered ‘vulnerable’ and ‘at risk’, but are simultaneously viewed as ‘risky’ (i.e. they could 
potentially become a threat) (Aradau, 2004; Heath-Kelly, 2013). This dual role – which most 
students would not even be aware of – is difficult to address for educational institutions. 
Secondly, as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Channel has become a 
legal requirement and is thus subject to a statutory framework rather in form of the exercise of 
‘soft power’. Under the statutory Prevent Duty, educational institutions can place referrals to 
Channel if they fear that certain individuals are at risk of being drawn into extremism (OSCB, 
2016). Referrals are assessed by the local Channel boards, consisting of school 
representatives, social workers, chairs of local Safeguarding Children Boards and Home 
Office Immigration as well as Border Force officials (Home Office, 2015c: 7). One of the key 
questions, however, is what happens to individuals once they have been referred to the 
Channel programme. According to Kundnani, Channel   
 
[…] sought to profile young people who were not suspected of involvement in criminal 
activity but nevertheless were regarded as drifting towards extremism. Through an 
extensive system of surveillance involving, among others, police officers, teachers, and 
youth and health workers, would-be radicals were identified and given counselling, 
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mentoring, and religious instruction in an attempt to reverse the radicalisation 
process. In some cases individuals were rehoused in new neighbourhoods to 
disconnect them from local influences considered harmful (Kundnani, 2014: 154).  
 
Evidently, referring youths to the Channel programme may trigger far-reaching consequences. 
Since the Prevent strategy’s introduction, the number of referrals to Channel has steadily 
risen: as can be seen in the Figure 4, the number of total referrals almost doubled from the 
year 2013/14 to 2014/15 and then again from 2014/15 to 2015-30/2/16. However, comparing 
the published Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests (Figure 4) with numbers published on 
the NPCC website (Figure 3), reveals a disparity in numbers. Due to a lack of background 
information (and the odd fact that the numbers of both Figure 3 and Figure 4 have been 
published by the NPCC), these variations cannot be explained.  
According to a FOI request published by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) in 2014, 67 percent of the referrals between April 2007 and December 2010 were 
recorded as Muslim. Other FOI requests do not indicate the number of Muslim referrals 
between 2007/8 and 2010/11. Between April 2012 and January 2014, 57 percent of referrals 
were recorded as Muslim. Due to the variation in data sets published on the NPCC website 
and in FOIs (also on the NPCC website), these numbers are by no means absolute. Despite 
this limitation, they can still serve as a valid reference point to get a general understanding of 
the proportions of referrals to local Channel boards. Notwithstanding the Prevent strategy’s 
claim to tackle all extremism, the reality of Channel referrals paints a rather different picture. 
In comparison, local authorities appear to be placing significantly fewer referrals for right or 
left-wing extremism than for international terrorism.   
Regarding the practice of the Prevent Duty in educational institutions, another FOI 
Request published by the NPCC indicates that the number of referrals made by schools 
between April 2012 and April 2016 is 1494 (NPCC, 2016b: 2). According to a 2016 Guardian 
article on the Prevent Duty and Channel referrals, teachers were responsible for one-third of 
all Channel referrals in 2015 – which, it is argued, can be ascribed to “nervousness about 
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missing signs of vulnerability” and “reporting incidents out of fear that they would be blamed 
if they failed to spot a student at risk” (Radcliffe, 2016).  
 
Figure 3 and 4: Referrals to Channel 
Referrals based on NPCC 
website 
Financial Year Total referrals 
2007/8 75 
2008/9 179 
2009/10 467 
2010/11 599 
2011/12 580 
2012/13 748 
2013/14 1281 
(Figure 3: Referrals to Channel. Sources: ACPO, 2014; NPCC, 2016). 
 
Referrals to the Channel Programme based on FOI Requests2 
Financial 
Year 
Total 
referrals 
International 
Terrorism 
International 
Islamist 
Terrorism 
Right 
Wing 
Extremism 
Left Wing 
Extremism 
Under 
18 
Under 
10 
2007/8 87 84  0 0 51 1 
2008/9 179 163  6 0 89 5 
2009/10 463 408  38 1 207 10 
2010/11 584 501  59 0 230 8 
2011/12 508 404  74 3 201 11 
2012/13 748 506 506 172 7 287 13 
2013/14 1292 876 876 312 5 425 24 
2014/15 2183 1630 1541 323 14 967 87 
2015-
30/3/20163 
4117 2966 2810 561 15 2074 311 
*Percentage of referrals recorded as Muslims between April 2007 and December 2010 (ACPO, 2014).  
** Percentage of referrals recorded as Muslims between April 2012 and January 2014 (ACPO, 2014).  
(Figure 4: Referrals to Channel. Sources: ACPO, 2014; NPCC, 2016). 
                                                 
2 Please also note that the FOI Requests did not provide information about each category for every year. This is 
why certain fields are lacking data and are left empty.  
3 Please note that a FOI Request was placed in order to receive more recent data on referral numbers. However, 
the FOI Request was denied by the NPCC due to reasons of public safety (see Appendix I).  
57%** 
67%* 
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The high number of referrals of under 18-year-olds discloses the Prevent strategy’s 
focus on young individuals at the risk of radicalisation (Figure 4; Figure 5). Despite the fact 
that the Prevent Duty applies to several local authorities (e.g. the NHS, social workers, 
schools) and the above figures refer to Channel referrals placed from all sort of institutions, 
schools appear to be responsible for a plenitude of referrals. This further reinforces the need 
to scrutinise the implications of the Prevent Duty in educational institutions. Figure 5 (based 
on Figure 4) provides an approximate visualisation of the under-18 referrals compared to the 
total referrals between 2007/8 and the 30/3/2016.  
 
Figure 5: Channel Referrals: Total vs. Under 18 
  
(Figure 5: Referrals to Channel, adapted from Figure 4. Sources: ACPO, 2014; NPCC, 2016). 
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Figure 6: Referrals to Channel: Total vs. International Terrorism 
  
(Figure 6: Referrals to Channel, adapted from Figure 4. Sources: ACPO, 2014; NPCC, 2016). 
 
While Figure 5 concentrates on referrals of children and teenagers, Figure 6 displays 
the approximate proportion of individuals reported for suspected International Terrorism. 
Both graphs elucidate the primary focus on ‘Under 18’ and ‘International Terrorism’ referrals 
to Channel – meaning that both of these – potentially overlapping – categories require specific 
attention. Despite the lack of data on referrals specifically designated as ‘International 
Islamist Terrorism’, it is likely that these numbers are to a great extent swallowed by the 
‘International Terrorism’ category.  
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Figure 8: Channel Referrals: Right-Wing vs. International Terrorism vs. Under 18 
  
(Figure 8: Data for referrals to Channel, adapted from Figure 4. Sources: ACPO, 2014; 
NPCC, 2016). 
 
In addition to the fact that the overall Channel referrals have been subject to a 
significant increase from 2013 to 2016, it can be seen that the referrals reported as 
‘International Terrorism’ are significantly higher than all others – with the exception of the 
last year, where the ‘Under 18’ referrals were equally substantial (and presumably 
overlapping).  
It has to be noted that the label ‘International Terrorism’ does not necessarily verify 
whether referrals were reported as Muslim or not. Only incomplete information is available 
on the amount of referrals categorised as ‘International Islamist Terrorism’: according to a 
Freedom of Information Request published by the ACPO in 2014, 67 percent of all referrals 
between April 2007 and December 2010 and 57 percent of all referrals between April 2012 
and January 2014 were recorded as Muslim (ACPO, 2014). How many of these referrals are 
also categorised as ‘International Terrorism’ or ‘Under 18’ – or both – remains unclear. Yet, 
the comparatively high percentages of referrals recorded as Muslim indicate that, in practice, 
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the Prevent strategy and Duty primarily target the Muslim population. The targeting of 
Muslims seems even more disproportionate considering the fact that, according to the Annual 
Population Survey for England and Wales, only 5.6 percent of the English and 1.5 percent of 
the Welsh population reported their religion as Muslim in 2014 (Office for National Statistics, 
2016). 
 
Vulnerability to radicalisation: A double-edged sword? 
The multi-layered concept of vulnerability is best assessed by taking a closer look at 
the notion of the Prevent Duty as a safe space in educational institutions. Equating the 
statutory duty with ‘safeguarding’ vulnerable students has been subject to heated controversy: 
treating students as vulnerable individuals who are simultaneously ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’ 
(Ramsay, 2017), the Prevent Duty has been criticised for “blurring […] vulnerability into 
presumed riskiness” (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 406). What is more, it has been under attack for 
bringing “state coercion into the educational space” (Ramsay, 2017: 16) and thereby 
preventing the very safe spaces of education that it seeks to facilitate. In order to investigate 
this criticism more in-depth, Ramsay’s (2017) comparison of educational safe spaces and the 
Prevent duty proves particularly useful.  
In line with the second objective to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, 
the Home Office provides the following definition for vulnerability:  
 
[a]pologists for violent extremism very often target individuals who, for a range of 
reasons, are vulnerable to their messages. Vulnerability is not simply a result of actual 
or perceived grievances. It may be the result of family or peer pressure, the absence of 
positive mentors and role models, a crisis of identity, links to criminality including 
other forms of violence, exposure to traumatic events (here or overseas), or changing 
circumstances (e.g. a new environment following migration and asylum)” (Home 
Office, 2009: 89). 
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The multitude of vulnerability indicators that educational staff are required to have ‘due 
regard’ to signals that vulnerability has “many dimensions” (Edwards, 2016: 301). Vulnerable 
individuals are described as ‘being at risk’ of ‘being drawn into’ terrorism – rendering them 
passive rather than active agents. It is important to recognise how the term ‘at risk’ removes 
the agency from vulnerable individuals, even though they are simultaneously perceived as 
having the potential to pose a threat to ‘British values’ and society.  
Evoking the imagery of vulnerability as a ‘double-edged sword, the dual role of ‘risky-
at-risk’ students casts doubt on the Home Office’s claim that “[s]afeguarding vulnerable 
people from radicalisation is no different from safeguarding them from other forms of harm” 
(Home Office, 2011). In this claim lies the crux of the whole safe spaces controversy: what is 
the difference between ‘inclusive safe spaces’ in classrooms and the safe spaces supposedly 
created by the Prevent Duty?  
I argue that the terminology of safeguarding is misleading and conveniently inflated in 
order to legitimise the Prevent Duty. Both radicalisation and safe spaces are relational 
concepts, meaning that it is the practical context that has to be considered. Assessing whether 
Prevent creates educational safe spaces, Ramsay infers that “Prevent should […] be 
understood as one example of a much wider tendency of surveillance and regulation of 
speech”, subsequently arguing that  
 
[t]he shared rationale of the two strategies indicates that Prevent draws its practical  
political legitimacy not from hostility to Muslims but from a much wider commitment 
to protecting vulnerable people from the ill-effects of others dangerous or offensive 
opinions (Ramsay, 2017: 3) 
 
While it is generally true that both dimensions of safe spaces share the rationale of 
safeguarding individuals from dangerous opinions, a more in-depth comparison reveals 
practical differences with regards to both the harm to be prevented as well as the 
consequences of the strategy’s implementation. Ramsay’s (2017) analysis is mainly 
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concerned with the Prevent Duty in higher education, however, most of his arguments are also 
applicable to schools.  
The harms to be prevented by both the Prevent Duty and the educational ‘inclusive 
safe spaces’ share two common features: they are “vaguely and expansively defined” and 
aimed at “securing educational spaces” (Ramsay, 2017: 8) from an “unchallenged expression” 
of harmful ideas (Ramsay, 2017: 10). It is precisely the nature of the harm that distinguishes 
the two strategies: the harm or threat that ought to be prevented in classrooms is 
discriminatory harassment, while the harm targeted by the Prevent Duty takes the form of 
radicalisation and extremism. Notably, the ulterior motive for seeking to prevent the harm of 
radicalisation is ultimately to “pre-empt the further harms that may result from any violence 
arising from a student’s radicalisation” (Ramsay, 2017: 7). What matters, then, is again the 
relational context of vulnerability: in the case of classroom safe spaces, the student if 
vulnerable to harassment of discrimination, as opposed to the Prevent Duty identifying the 
student as vulnerable to becoming radicalised. Thus, in the latter case the student is vulnerable 
to becoming a threat (Ramsay, 2017: 7). In other words, it is essentially the double-edged 
nature of the term vulnerability, incorporated in the statutory duty of teachers to have ‘due 
regard’ to vulnerable students at the risk of being drawn into extremism, that may function as 
a misnomer masking the real intention of identifying those posing a terrorism threat.   
By drawing on the terminology of educational safe spaces it transpires that the 
government may be interested in concealing the double-edged character of vulnerability under 
the Prevent Duty. Seemingly stripped of their agency, vulnerable students ought to be 
protected, just as it is laid out in the original ‘Statutory Guidance on Making Arrangements to 
Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children under Section 11 of the Children Act 2004’:  
Consequently, staff in […] [schools] play an important part in safeguarding children 
from abuse and neglect by early identification of children who may be vulnerable or at risk of 
harm and by educating children about managing risks and improving their resilience through 
the curriculum (Statutory Guidance on Making Arrangements to Safeguard and Promote the 
Welfare of Children under Section 11 of the Children Act 2004, 2007: 36).  
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The vital definition that discerns safe spaces in the classroom lies within the emphasis 
on educating children: “by educating children […] and improving their resilience through the 
curriculum”. What follows is that ‘inclusive’ safe spaces are spaces where individuals should 
be able to  
 
fully express, without fear of being made to feel uncomfortable, unwelcome, or unsafe 
on account of biological sex, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
expression, cultural background, religious affiliation, age, or physical or mental 
ability (Safe Space Network, 2017).  
 
Arguably, while the educational safe spaces adhere to the foregoing definition, the Prevent 
Duty fails to do so. Despite the government’s efforts to legitimise the Prevent Duty by 
drawing on the terminology of ‘inclusive’ safe spaces, the safe spaces created by Prevent 
introduce a dual role of ‘risky-at-risk’ students – thereby engendering very different 
consequences. Even though both safeguarding duties regulate the freedom of expression in 
certain ways, it can be argued that the Prevent Duty, as part of the government’s 
counterterrorism strategy, may entail comparatively far-reaching consequences if students are 
identified as vulnerable to radicalisation. One of these consequences may be the referral to a 
local Channel board. Uncertainty about the meaning of ‘non-violent extremism’ in 
combination with the vague definition of ‘British values’ renders it problematic to identify 
radicalisation in the first place – which is precisely why critics of the Prevent Duty fear that it 
may potentially be “counterproductive, having a chilling effect on the willingness of students 
and teachers to debate difficult questions” (Marsden, 2015).  
There is a case to be made that the Prevent Duty may facilitate a different kind of safe 
space: due to the dual role of students as both vulnerable and a threat, and the perception of 
Islamist radicalism being the primary threat, it creates an ‘exclusive’ safe space, where 
students may refrain from raising controversial opinions about topics such as Islamism and 
extremism. While both the implementation of the Prevent duty as well as ‘inclusive’ safe 
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spaces may share the common feature of regulating the freedom of expression, the chilling 
effect caused by the Prevent Duty could be more significant. It identifies students as 
vulnerable to ideas opposing ‘British values’, and lacks any easily discernible definition. 
Effectively, the ‘exclusive’ safe space created by the Prevent Duty adds the element of 
suppressive surveillance to the classroom rather than encouraging an engaging and inclusive 
debate. Possibly motivated by the desire to give legitimacy to the Prevent agenda, the Home 
Office’s claim that “[s]afeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation is no different from 
safeguarding them from other forms of harm” (Home Office, 2011) turns out to be misleading 
and ill-informed. The consequences of enforcing ‘exclusive’ safe spaces under the Prevent 
Duty will be critically examined in the subsequent section. 
 
‘Bestowing Mistrust’: The Prevent Duty in Practice 
In theory, the non-statutory guidance for schools on the promotion of British values advises 
teachers to  
 
ensure that all pupils within the school have a voice that is listened to, and 
demonstrate how democracy works by actively promoting democratic processes such 
as a school council whose members are voted for by the pupils (Department of 
Education, 2014: 6).  
 
In reality, however, the Prevent strategy as well as the Prevent Duty have been criticised for 
“bestowing mistrust” in the Muslim community (Miqdaad Versi, quoted in Ullah, 2016) based 
on allegations that the Prevent strategy is discriminatory in nature and used to gather 
intelligence about Muslim students and communities (Home Office, 2011b). Such allegations 
indicate that Prevent has a rather negative impact on relationships with Muslim communities, 
thus failing at implementing the strategy’s third objective of promoting partnership work 
(Awan, 2012; Allen, 2011; Bonino, 2013; Qureshi, 2014; Spalek, 2011; Taylor, 2018). 
Despite this nexus of allegations as well as the Home Office’s realisation in 2011 that “[t]rust 
  
 
 
 
 
Lynn Dudenhoefer: Resisting Radicalisation 
 
 
 
 
176 
in Prevent must be improved” (Home Office, 2011b: 6), the wider political context recently 
contributed to an even more entrenched approach to the ‘good Muslim’/‘bad Muslim’ binary: 
on June 7, 2017, Theresa May announced that in the fight against terrorism, “things need to 
change” by providing security and intelligence agencies with “the powers they need”, 
subsequently stating that “[…] if our human rights laws get in the way of doing it, we will 
change the law so we can do it” (BBC News, 2017). May could have been referring to Article 
15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the invocation of which would allow the 
UK to depart from specific parts of the ECHR in limited times of emergency (BBC News, 
2017). May’s decision to make a case for departing from human rights law lead to significant 
resistance in the ranks of both Labour and Liberal Democrats, arguing that countering 
terrorism would not succeed “by ripping up basic human rights” (BBC News, 2017). Rather 
than a new response to the terrorism threat, May’s statements represent the continuation of a 
trend of political speeches and punitive populism calling for harsher counterterrorism 
measures.  
On March 21, 2006, Tony Blair asserted that “[t]his terrorism will not be defeated 
until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in 
their essence, at their core” (HM Government, 2006: 10), which led the Home Office to the 
conclusion that countering terrorism materialises in form of  
 
a battle of ideas, challenging the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify 
the use of violence. In particular, we are working with communities to help them 
discourage susceptible individuals from turning towards extremist activity (HM 
Government, 2006: 10).  
 
Driven by the political agenda to govern ‘susceptible individuals’, i.e. to control individuals 
“at risk of becoming risky” (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 397), the Prevent Duty invokes a nebulous 
nexus of an ideological ‘battle of ideas’ against ‘non-violent extremism’ by promoting 
‘British values’. It is this insidious system that holds significant potential to infringe on 
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human rights, thereby bolstering the Prevent Duty’s ‘exclusive’ safeguarding practices. What 
further reinforces this chilling effect on human rights are the consequences of a failure to 
‘have due regard to’ radicalisation in students, which is likely to “bring the attention of the 
state’s security bureaucracy” (Ramsay, 2017: 15).  
Trying to prevent radicalisation in children and teenagers raises especially difficult 
questions: “[f]or example, how, in what ways and to what extent are ‘radicalised’ youth 
displaying ‘destructive emotions’ and in what ways are practitioners working with and trying 
to influence these?” (Spalek, 2010). The aforementioned binary definition of Islam in the UK 
in combination with ‘a battle of thoughts’ with its focal point of ‘non-violent extremism’ 
renders it problematic to differentiate between simply rebellious or radicalised teenagers. The 
online Prevent Duty toolkit for schools provided by the Oxfordshire Safeguarding Children 
Board (OSCB) pinpoints potential consequences of a flawed implementation:  
 
Over-simplified assessments based upon demographics and poverty indicators have 
consistently demonstrated to increase victimisation, fail to identify vulnerabilities and, 
in some cases, increase the ability of extremists to exploit, operate and recruit (OSCB, 
2016: 3) 
 
However, applying the Prevent Duty in a non-biased manner may turn into an insurmountable 
task given the complexity and multitude of vulnerability indicators. Positioning themselves in 
a social world, young individuals’ identities are still forming and being formed. A survey 
conducted by Holley and Steiner (2005) reinforces the importance of ‘inclusive’ educational 
safe spaces: 121 Social Works baccalaureate and master students at a Western university were 
asked to define ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ classroom environments. The majority of students 
described safe spaces as “nonjudgmental or unbiased” and unsafe spaces as involving 
instructors who “were critical of or chastised students; were biased, opinionated, or 
judgmental; and refused to consider others’ opinions” (Holley and Steiner, 2005: 57).  
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A report on the practical implications of the Prevent Duty in educational institutions 
by Busher, Choudhury, Thomas, and Harris (2017) underpins the claim that many teachers 
and students perceive the Prevent Duty’s impact on educational safe spaces as highly 
problematic. For their report, Busher et al. (2017) conducted in-depth interviews with 70 
education professionals across 14 schools in West Yorkshire and London as well as with 8 
local authority level Prevent practitioners working to support schools and colleges. In 
addition, a national online survey of school and college staff (n=225) and a series of feedback 
and discussion sessions with Muslim civil society organisations were carried out. Among 
other key results, the study found “a strong current of concern, particularly among BME 
respondents, that the Prevent duty is making it more difficult to foster an environment in 
which students from different backgrounds get on well with one another” (Busher et al., 2017: 
6). While Busher et al. do acknowledge that their findings may be subject to a range of 
interpretations, they also conclude that the Prevent Duty could exacerbate feelings of 
stigmatisation among Muslim students (Busher et al., 2017: 7). 
When providing oral evidence on the Counter-extremism Bill on March 9, 2016, the 
former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism David Anderson highlighted that the Prevent Duty 
is likely to induce the latter, ‘unsafe’ form of environment:  
 
I remember talking to a lady in the north-west who teaches at a college for 16 to 19 
year-olds. ISIS comes up quite often. She used to use that as an opportunity for a 
discussion: “What are they doing? Why are they using violence? Are there other ways 
of doing it? What about Martin Luther King? What about Mahatma Ghandi?” 
Someone mentioned the IRA. “Is that the same as ISIS?” You would have a discussion 
and the toxic views would come out, which would hopefully be blunted or neutralised 
– or at least the people who held those views would be given something else to think 
about. She says that if that happens now, you absolutely choke off the discussion 
because the teachers are watching their backs and they do not want to be reported 
(Anderson, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2016: 4).   
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Precisely this repercussion of the Prevent Duty has the capacity not only of infringing on 
human rights but possibly also inhibiting a natural progression of identity formation in young 
individuals. After all, “[t]he question ‘Who am I?’ is one of the most challenging we can ask” 
(Marranci, 2007: 138) and is, to a great extent, both context-dependent and formed through 
interaction. Thus, the conjunction of the statutory duty to ‘have due regard’, the fear of 
Channel referrals and the ‘good Muslim/bad Muslim’ binary, is likely to have the reverse 
effect of fostering radicalisation in British Muslim youths. As Yaqoob asks, if schools are 
“reluctant to provide the space for sensitive discussions for fear of extremist’s accusations, 
where are these young people to go? Where will their views and concern get an airing?” 
(Yaqoob, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
 
The main issue of the Prevent Duty may just be that it has become counter-productive: “The 
focus on radicalization has both complicated the task of those engaged in community 
cohesion and generated fears of stigmatizing communities” (Richards, 2009: 152). Arguably, 
the Prevent Duty undermines the educationally envisioned ‘inclusive’ safe spaces, where 
students feel safe enough to speak freely and discuss controversial topics. The process by 
which the Prevent Duty inhibits these safe spaces is rooted in its potential to infringe on 
human rights, predominantly on the right to freedom of expression. Simultaneously, though, 
the Prevent Duty constructs a different kind of safe space, distinguishable by its ‘exclusive’ 
nature. The students’ dual role of being both vulnerable and a risk in combination with the 
perception of Islamist radicalism as the primary threat creates an ‘exclusive’ safe space, 
where students avoid raising controversial opinions due to potentially far-reaching 
consequences (not least being referred to Channel). 
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Recommendations: Engagement over Targeting 
 
In the light of the recent terror attacks and the recommendation of Max Hill, the current 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism, to critically review the Prevent strategy, it is vital to 
highlight that any changes to the Prevent strategy should be undertaken without repeating old 
mistakes. Already in 2010, Spalek suggested that 
 
there needs to be much greater acknowledgment of the diversity of individuals within a 
particular social group and/or network, and also that the notion of empowerment 
needs to be unpicked, because empowering individuals in terms of their own personal, 
educational and other developments is not necessarily empowering the particular 
religious, political or other groups they belong to, nor is it empowering religious, 
political and other ideologies (Spalek, 2011: 201). 
 
A more promising approach, then, consist of a shift in focus from a predominant ‘targeting’ of 
Muslim communities to ‘engaging’ with them.  
Evidently, the Prevent strategy suffers from a widespread problem of perception or, as 
argued by the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism, David Anderson: “[i]t is perverse 
that Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than 
the police and ministerial powers (Anderson, n.d.: 3). One of the key criticisms of Prevent 
appears to be its failure to engage communities, and particularly Muslim communities.  
It is engagement that could serve as an important ingredient in tackling radicalisation. 
According to Horgan’s (2013) research on the de-radicalisation of former terrorists, a 
disengaged terrorist is not necessarily de-radicalised – meaning that the process of de-
radicalisation may not have taken place, despite the individual’s apparent disengagement. He 
or she may still hold ‘radical’ opinions (Horgan, 2013: 19). Such findings support Spalek’s 
recommendation that the prevention of radicalisation and ‘home-grown’ terrorism can and 
should focus on the engagement of both the individual and communities (Spalek, 2011). 
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Based on the Prevent strategy continuously failing to grapple with the criticism that “it 
enables the government to exclude potentially any Muslim group from engagement” (Spalek 
and McDonald, 2010: 128), what should follow is a focus on a bottom-up than top-down 
approach. This grassroots-approach would require a shift towards engagement, conversation 
and trust-building (Kundnani, 2009; Spalek, 2011). According to Kundnani (2009),  
 
genuine trust can only come from the bottom up. So long as the government persists in 
a programme of imposing on its own citizens an ideological war over ‘values’ that is 
backed up with an elaborate web of surveillance, that trust will not be forthcoming. 
And those on the receiving end of such a programme will remain ‘spooked’ by fear, 
alienation and suspicion (Kudnani, 2009: 41).  
 
In addition to a focus on trust-building, Horgan’s (2013) findings also draw attention to 
another relevant issue: engaging individuals considered as ‘radical’ or formerly ‘radical’ may 
be one of the key components that have to be addressed by any future revision of the Prevent 
strategy. While this may prove to be a rather complex endeavour, it first requires the 
terminological disconnection from ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’ – potentially by abandoning 
the term ‘non-violent extremism’.   
The definition of ‘radical’ varies according to the shared norms of the majority of the 
population. In other words, individuals who are perceived to hold radical opinions may not 
necessarily qualify as extremists, or consider extremist means. This realisation renders the 
notion of non-violent extremism highly problematic, and possibly unpalatable against the 
backdrop of the right to freedom of expression and thought. In schools in particular, students 
need to be able to discuss sensitive matters and teachers “must have the integrity of their 
professional norms protected against the expectation that they become the eyes and ears of 
counterterrorist policing” (Kundnani, 2009: 7). Instead, by facilitating dialogue and debate, 
confidence in government initiatives may slowly be built, which could ideally result in the 
community cohesion that the UK urgently requires (Spalek and McDonald, 2010).  
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Rather than retaining the illusion that the Prevent strategy in its current state is capable of 
tackling radicalisation, the following three recommendations should be given priority:  
 
1. The widespread allegations about Prevent being a spying and surveillance 
programme have to be met with increased transparency. Arguably, a few decisive 
factors include better training for educational staff, the publication of training 
materials, as well as the regular publication of Channel referral numbers.  
2. What should be strongly encouraged is to diversify the “membership of the Prevent 
Advisory Boards” as well as the local Channel boards (Anderson, n.d.: 3).  
3. The Prevent strategy, including the Prevent Duty, should “be the subject of review 
by an independent panel with the relevant range of expertise, and with direct input 
from the internet generation” (Anderson, n.d.: 3).  
 
Arguably, the third recommendation is paramount for future implementation of the Prevent 
Duty and the overall UK Prevent strategy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Prevent Duty in educational institutions is deeply flawed in its implementation, and may 
have significant potential to further alienate and radicalise the British Muslim population. 
Despite such worrying findings and the increasingly frequent occurrence of recent terror 
attacks in the UK, I agree that “optimism should be the exhortation. And for an optimistic 
future, both the mainstream societies as well as diaspora-based Muslim communities should 
realise that their common future would be shared” (Mukhopadhyay, 2007: 111). This shared 
future is best secured by standing firmly for the preservation of human rights, fostering 
constructive and engaging dialogue and defying the illusion that terrorism could be defeated 
by shutting down opposing opinions. Preventing challenging conversation is probably more 
likely to suspend radical opinions rather than tackle their root causes. 
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